With the advent of the Internet, social media platforms have become an increasingly popular medium of communication for people. Platforms like Twitter and Quora allow people to express their opinions on a large scale. These platforms are, however, plagued by the problem of hate speech and toxic content. Such content is generally sexist, homophobic or racist. Automatic text classification can filter out toxic content so some extent. In this paper, we discuss the adversarial attacks on hate speech classifiers. We demonstrate that by changing the text slightly, a classifier can be fooled to misclassifying a toxic comment as acceptable. We attack hate speech classifiers with known attacks as well as introduce four new attacks. We find that our method can degrade the performance of a Random Forest classifier by 20%. We hope that our work sheds light on the vulnerabilities of text classifiers, and opens doors for further research on this topic.
INTRODUCTION
The Internet revolution has led to the widespread use of online forums in all strata of society. Today, everyone from children to senior citizens uses the internet. Several online platforms like Quora, Twitter and Facebook consist of an interaction between users in the form of text; either messaging or comments. With this wide proliferation, cyber abuse and harassment has become a pressing issue. Hate speech is any form of expression which is intended to demean and brutalize a target (a person, a particular community or organization) by the use of cruel and derogatory language on the basis of real or alleged membership in a social group. Oftentimes, the underlying basis for hate speech are attributes such as race, religion, ethnic origin, national origin, sex, disability, sexual orientation, or gender identity. Hate speech is a pressing issue in all platforms that permit text as a medium of expression. Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s). CCS '19, November 11-15, 2019, London, United Kingdom © 2019 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-6747-9/19/11. https://doi.org/10. 1145/3319535.3363271 Recent advances in machine learning have demonstrated the effectiveness of deep learning models in language modeling [1] and thus, text classification. Similar to tasks like sentiment analysis, hate speech can be detected using machine learning. Several online forums employ machine learning classifiers for identifying and classifying toxic content. However, machine learning models are susceptible to adversarial attacks [5] . It is possible to deliberately construct examples which can fool the classifier into mis-classifying content. Malicious actors can employ these adversarial attacks so that their abusive content is not removed from the platform. Adversarial image generation consists of modifying pixel values so that the overall image appears unchanged to the naked eye, but a classifier is fooled into misclassifying it. Generating adversarial text examples is a challenging task, primarily because small perturbations in the text can change the meaning, or render the text entirely meaningless.
In this poster, we demonstrate how easy it is to fool machine learn classifiers by attacking various classifiers with simple, yet effective methods. With the simple techniques we describe, an adversary can effectively rewrite his malicious content so that a classifier will classify it to not to be hate speech, when, in fact, it is hateful content. Although the text is distorted to some extent, the meaning of the text is still preserved. Such attacks, if successfully executed, can defeat the purpose of automatic hate speech classification engines. This poster represents the preliminary work of our experiments on developing more robust classifiers for sensitive applications like hate speech detection.
OVERVIEW OF TEXT CLASSIFICATION
Text classification involves two main steps: (1) tokenizing the text to obtain a numerical representation for every entity(document or sentence), and (2) using these features as input to a machine learning model, which outputs the probabilities of the entity belonging to various classes. Algorithmic and methodological choices made in both of these steps affects the overall performance of the classifier. Feature Engineering. In the feature extraction phase, we need to obtain numerical representations for our documents. This is because most machine learning models involve optimization of model weights, which requires all the features to be in numeric form. The most common technique to obtain a numeric representation is the Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) [2] . It is a measure which ranks a word in direct proportion to the number of times it occurs in a particular document and inversely to the number of documents that contain this word. Words which occur frequently in a document but not so frequently in other documents are likely to yield valuable features for that document. However, the drawback of the TF-IDF technique is that it does not consider sequence relationship between the words, which can lead to loss of valuable information. To overcome this drawback, word embeddings [4] are used in which a fixed-length vector is obtained for every word, depending on the words surrounding it. Embedding vectors of related words are close together in cartesian space. For instance, the embedding vectors for 'Apple' and 'Mango' will have a high cosine similarity whereas those for 'Apple' and 'Buddhism' will have a low similarity score. The word embedding approach also has an important drawback: it ignores the fact that the same word may have different meanings in different contexts. For instance, the word bank has widely different meanings in the sentences 'I was walking by the river bank' and 'I am going to the bank for some work'. To solve this problem, recent works have explored contextual embeddings [1] in which a word will have different embeddings depending upon the contexts in which it is used. Machine Learning. After extracting the features into a numerical form, we then feed them as inputs to our machine learning classifiers. There are two fundamental paradigms in machine learning: supervised learning in which a model is trained with labeled input examples to learn the mapping from features to labels and unsupervised learning in which a model identifies patterns and structure in data. Classification is generally modeled as a supervised learning task. Deep neural networks are a popular candidate for classification. A network contains several layers of neurons, which are basically computational units. Input flows from the input layer, undergoes several transformations through the intermediate layers (also called as hidden layers), and produces and output which is then used to determine the predicted class label. A specific class of neural networks, called Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) [3] excels at processing sequential data (like text) because of its ability to remember past inputs. Another popular algorithm for classification is the Decision Tree, a data structure in which the leaf nodes refer to class labels. All the non-leaf notes represent certain input features, and their children represent the various possible values taken by the features. Basically, a decision tree implements a rule-based classification system. For classifying a particular data point, we begin traversing from the root of the tree till we reach a leaf node. In practice, an ensemble version of decision trees called Random Forest is often used for classification tasks. The benefit of using a multitude of decision trees instead of a single one is that the former overcomes the problem of overfitting (a model being tuned to the specific dataset and thus leading to loss of generalizability) caused by the latter. Other popular algorithms for classification are Linear Regression, Support Vector Machine (SVM) and gradient boosted classifiers [2] .
PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 3.1 Word Splitting
This is a novel method proposed by us in which we split long words into shorter words. We try to split the words into two parts such that one word is the first syllable, and the second word consists of the remaining syllables. For example, 'experience' would be split into 'ex perience' and 'procrastinate' would be split into 'pro crastinate'.
In our experiments, we perform syllable identification in a very naive manner. For every word, we examine the second alphabet. If it is a vowel, then the first three letters are considered to be one syllable. Otherwise, the first two letters are chosen to be the first syllable. The reason for choosing the split points based on the syllables and not randomly is that when the text is manually examined, a word written as two words based on the syllables can be considered to be a plausible human error (based on non-expertise in english) and may not necessarily be attributed to an adversarial attack. We choose the words to be split based on the length of the words (longer words would have more syllables) and an upper bound on the number of words to be split (too many split words may alert a human annotator of an adversarial attack).
Word Merging
In the merging method, we combine adjacent words into a single word. We eliminate spaces between a certain number of word pairs chosen at random. For example, the sentence 'I think that we should not read articles written by such authors' could be transformed into 'I think thatwe should not read articles written bysuch authors. As with the word splitting attack, this attack cannot easily be detected by a human annotator. Forgetting to hit the space bar is a very common occurence, that happens to even people with the best of intentions. Such examples will be attributed to human errors as compared to deliberate attacks. The number of word pairs to be merged are controlled by an upper bound, because too many merged words may alert a human annotator of our malicious intent.
Drop-a-Letter
In this attack, we drop a letter from a random selection of words. We impose a length constraint on the words; that is, we select only long words with a minimum length. The longer the word, the more imperceptible the omission of a letter in it. We specifically choose either the middle or the last character to drop because such a change is not easily noticeable to the human eye. A human reader will understand a long word as intended even if a letter somewhere in the middle or at the end has been dropped.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 4.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets. To test our hypotheses, we conducted experiments on the Kaggle Twitter Hate Speech dataset. This dataset consists of 32000 tweets, out of which 2200 are deemed to be toxic or abusive. The abusive tweets cover several themes such as homophobia, white supremacy, racism and misogyny. Data Preprocessing. The data preprocessing consisted of removing punctuations and common stop words. In addition, some nonstandard characters (greek alphabets, emoticons) were also removed. In order to extract features from the text and represent them in a numeric form, we used the Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) representations. Classifiers. In order to validate our hypotheses and the effectiveness of our attacks, we considered two classifier models: Random Forest and Gradient Boosted Classifier. These algorithms are commonly used in text classification applications. We used the implementations with from the Scikit-Learn library to build our classifiers. We used the standard parameters as recommended by the library.
Results
Evaluation Metrics. As with most machine learning applications, the evaluation metric we consider is the F-1 score. The accuracy metric here has little meaning due to the high class imbalance. Furthermore, we can assume that the aim of a reasonable adversary attacking a hate speech (or any text classification) system is to generate positive examples that are classified as negative (i.e. toxic content classified as permitted). Therefore, we also use the number of false negatives as a measure of how successful the attacks are. Attack Effectiveness. To study the effects of our attacks, first we split our dataset into training and testing sets. We use 80% of the data for training and the remaining 20% for testing. To establish baselines, we first train our classification models and test them on the created test set. To observe the performance on adversarial examples, we create adversarial test sets for each attack, and use these as test sets for classifiers trained on the original, unperturbed data. The effectiveness of the attacks can be observed from the figures in Tables 1 and 2 
Discussion
The experimental results show that the attacks proposed in this paper are effective in misleading the classifier. In particular, we see that the adversarial examples increase the false negatives for the classifiers. For both the observed classifiers, the dropping of the middle character is the most effective attacks. In the random forest, it causes 74% more false negatives and decreases F-1 score by 19%. Similarly, in the gradient boosted classifier,it causes 59% more false negatives and decreases the F-1 score by 21%. The increase in number of false negatives is concerning, as it potentially defeats the purpose of hate speech classifiers. An example of the damage that can be done by such attacks is evidenced in the classifier scores as shown in figure 1.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE SCOPE
Studying and countering adversarial attacks is the need of the hour, especially in sensitive applications like hate speech or toxic content detection. In this poster, we have described the preliminary results of our work on adversarial text examples. We propose three attacks: word splitting, word merging and character dropping. We validate the effectiveness of our attacks on two baseline classifiers: the random forest and the gradient boosted classifiers. Experimental results show that the attacks are effective, and significantly increase the number of false negatives produced by the classifier. This implies that an adversary can bypass a hate speech detection engine and pass of their toxic content as benign.
These results give rise to several research questions. First, it remains to be seen whether these attacks are just as effective when it comes to features extracted from word embeddings or contextual embeddings. Second, extensive experiments are needed to further validate these attacks and test their effectiveness on various other classifiers. Finally, there is also the important question of how to defend systems against these attacks.
